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The transformation of the political relations in Europe at the dawn of the 21st 
century resulted in deep changes in the concepts of security and collective defense. 
In the context of NATO becoming an organization dedicated to freedom and 
democratic values, Romania reconsidered its political and strategic position, started 
profound reforms in its security institutions and continues to consolidate the democratic 
statecraft. 
This thesis examines the influence of NATO mechanisms on Romanian National 
Security in the Post Cold War Era. The analysis is primarily concerned with examining 
the building blocks and mechanisms by which NATO extends its institutional and 
normative influence and contributes or not to reducing chances for military conflict and 
political tension in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, by integrating them 
into the Western security community and increasing the speed of democratic domestic 
reforms. 
The analysis concludes that through NATO influence, Romania has developed 
into a major factor of peace and stability in the area and could become an important 
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I would like to express my entire admiration for the American society, and for all 
the things that have been made possible during my course of study. I showed my feelings  
of love for American values and people in the speech that I gave on International 
Memorial Day for the victims of September 11, 2001:1 
Ladies and gentlemen, children, dear American friends, 
It is a hard moment for everyone to remember the shocking events that 
shattered our lives, one week ago. No words can possibly describe the 
enormous drama lived by the American people in the tragic events. 
Tuesday, 11 September, we got a glimpse of what the world could be 
without America, and I can honestly tell you that we did not like such a 
perspective. The US is not something external to us. We care for its 
symbols and WTC and the Pentagon are very important ones. But most of 
all we care for those people who were killed in these unbelievable events 
and their loving families who suffer so much. On behalf of my colleagues, 
I wish to express our great compassion for every person who was so badly 
affected by this tragedy. 
We have all, with no discrimination among nationality, lost 
something. At least our innocence and our naivety are gone for a while. 
The hope for a better world was questionable. 
After the Cold War, the US represented the major source of inspiration for 
the newborn democracies from the Eastern part of Europe. The American 
material and spiritual help was extremely important, and the light of 
freedom was shining from the American souls. 
Today, we are here to show you that your work is useful and we share 
your faith in democracy, freedom, responsibility, and tolerance. United by 
these values, we support you in the dangerous fight against the forces of 
darkness. 
As a personal point of view, two months ago I spent 10 days in 
New York and every day, with my family, we went to visit Manhattan. 
The Americans symbols were there and we saw them. Today, when dust 
covers WTC we all have the honorable duties to keep this symbol in our 
heart and tell everyone about their vision of liberty and prosperity. 
Most of my last six years, I had the chance to work with American friends 
and every day I have discovered the power of the American spirit. Today, 
there is a lot of pain and desire of revenge in every American soul but I am 
sure that this situation will be overcome and the American ideals will win. 
God bless America and all of us. 
                                                 





























At the beginning of the 21st century Europe’s political and economic order is by 
no means settled. It is rapidly shifting and Europe is changing in a new political 
environment. The Cold War is over, the major threats and fears of global war’s 
cataclysms are gone, bringing deep and dramatic changes from  the bipolar model of 
relationship between the superpowers and rearranging the security relations and the 
existing status quo. 
The East-West confrontation and the dividing line in the core of Europe 
disappeared. At the same time, European security institutions underwent significant 
changes, the Warsaw pact was dissolved but NATO unquestionably remained the security 
defense framework of Western Europe.  
This research is motivated by the current debate on NATO Enlargement which I 
think is concentrated mostly on two trends, both of them probably missing some key 
elements of the process. First, a major concern is the impact of the new members on the 
Alliance (institutionally, politically, financially, and militarily). Second, the capacity of 
those selected to cope with NATO’s requirements is also a concern. In both cases the 
analysis is static. For a better understanding of the benefits and losses of such a process, a 
chronological view of the NATO influence on a state is helpful. In the case of Romanian 
public opinion and literature on NATO membership, the process is treated obsessively at 
all the levels and politician’s concentration is on the momentum, emotions, and electoral 
gain rather than on long term project and objective calculations. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
By looking at the Romanian case, I will try to see if the institutional and 
normative adjustments induced by NATO’s cooperative security arrangements are 





C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis discusses the following questions: 
· What are the alternatives to assure national security for Romania? 
· Why and how much is Romania interested in NATO membership? 
· What are the Romanian’s arguments for NATO membership? 
· What are NATO’s mechanisms of influence? 
· What is the NATO impact on Romanian-Hungarian relations? 
· What is NATO’s influence on the restructuring process of the Romanian 
Armed Forces? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
There are many factors that have an impact on Romanian National Security, 
NATO being one of them. As a result, the thesis does not seek comprehensive causal 
explanation. The research tries to describe institutions and events in coherent ways that 
make sense of the actions we observe. In my analysis I try to understand the effects of 
NATO mechanisms on Romanian policies and organizations. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Logically, the international institution’s ability to influence domestic policies and 
organizations is closely connected with the respective state desire to obtain its 
membership. Without a strong will behind the main internal actors to join the 
international institution, the influence that the external factor can exercise is hugely 
diminished. Consequently, I will start my thesis with an analysis of the rationale behind 
Romania’s desire for NATO membership. 
An analysis of the main mechanisms through which NATO can exercise influence 
on outside actors follows. Chapter three is a chronological description of the development 
of NATO’s main instruments for dealing with new aspirant countries: North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the New 
Strategic Concept, and Membership Action Plan. Through these structures, organizations, 
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and programs, NATO exercises its main influence on domestic actors responsible for 
national security elaboration and implementation. 
Chapter four presents the impact of NATO on Romanian - Hungarian relations in 
the last decade. The reason behind the selection of this case is given by the pattern of 
historical enmity between Romania and Hungary. Romania has the largest Hungarian 
minority in the region and minority tensions were in the headlines in the beginning of 
1990s and even today are a delicate subject in the Balkans and area around. Any success 
in improving the relations between these two states increases the significance of external 
factors in stabilizing and harmonious development of the region. Chapter five looks at 
major military reforms in the Romanian Armed Forces as a result of NATO’s 
requirements. In spite of all the discussions about NATO as a political organization, the 
main focus of the Alliance was and will remain a military one. The defense area is a 
primary concern for NATO and Romania’s reaction in shaping its military policies and 
forces provides a good case for analysis. 
In the conclusion, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of NATO in 
influencing positive trends in Romania.  
NATO and specifically the Membership Action Plan framework has helped 
Romania deliver reforms in both the civic and military context that otherwise would not 
have been possible. NATO’s programs, structures, and people have guided important 
aspects of the Romania’s transition to a democratic society. 
The thesis tries to find out NATO’s ability to successfully plant the institutional 
and normative seeds necessary for the incorporation of Romania into the Western 
community by encouraging good relations with neighbor countries and development of 
modern Armed Forces. 
NATO and Romania have a tough way to go and the final results will depend on 
both sides, but the lesson of history has proven that the Alliance is able to bring 
prosperity for its citizen and defend values such freedom and individual rights. After four 
decades of communism and with political leadership unable to find a viable solution for 
the transition process, the Romanian population anchors their hopes in NATO’s 
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II. ROMANIA'S ARGUMENTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP  
For more than four decades the world was divided into the Eastern and Western 
Blocs. Each side was not only politically aligned but was also militarily protected by its 
own security organization, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively. At the end of the 
20th century the Cold War was over bringing deep and dramatic changes into the bipolar 
model of international relations. In eastern and central Europe, former members of the 
Warsaw Pact and newly emerging countries were left in a security vacuum. 
Facing tensions and instabilities from the hard process of democratization and 
introduction of free market reform in the economic sector, Romania has tried to find 
ways to diminish its security risks in the new unstable environment. 
After more than 50 years of success in providing security to its members, and 
persisting after the major reason for its creation disappeared with the collapse of Soviet 
Empire, NATO is the most attractive solution. 
The purpose of this chapter is to find an answer for the following question: Why 
and how much is Romania interested in NATO membership? 
Even though we share the idea of NATO being a key element on the European 
security stage, we need to investigate other potential security options for Romania. Are 
there any other alternatives to NATO that Romania might prefer? 
In order to analyze the Romanian security environment and find alternatives for 
NATO membership in the Post Cold War Era, we need to make three assumptions. The 
first assumption is that after NATO’s first round of enlargement there is a disparity of 
security in central and eastern Europe. 
The second assumption, in contradiction with the idea of an indivisible Europe, is 
that European countries outside NATO and EU, even though they are considered 
members of the European family, do not feel included in the European architecture of 
security. 
The final one is that, in spite of Kantian-Wilsonian solutions (OSCE, European 
Council etc.), the European security system is a Westphalian one, which needs a balance 
of power in order to function properly. In this arrangement states situated in the gray area 
between NATO and Russia are weak because of their recent statality and slow economic 
6 
and political reforms after the fall of communism. Consequently, their individual role in 
the balance of power is not significant. 
A. ALTERNATIVES TO NATO MEMBERSHIP 
1. EU Integration 
Romania has traditional ties with the European Union. It was the only Eastern 
European country, which as early as the '70s developed a well-defined juridical 
framework in its relations with the European Community. The goal of attaining the EU 
membership, in a short time period, constitutes an absolute priority for Romania's policy. 
Romania's major objectives for seeking to join the Community structures take into 
account: 
· the consolidation of the political system and of the democratic institutions;  
· the creation of an economic and social climate that would offer a maximum of 
satisfaction and benefits to its citizens;  
· the improving of the efficiency of market economy structures and 
mechanisms;  
· the strengthening of political, economic and social cooperation with the 
European Union member states and the candidate countries; and 
· the consolidation of Romania's statute on the European and international 
scene, in terms of stability and security. 2 
Romania is on the way to satisfying the political criteria completely, and has 
made significant progress in the establishment of a viable market economy, even though 
this requires an ongoing substantial effort. Major difficulties are also encountered in the 
installation of a true competition climate; at the same time, the essential elements of the 
“acquis communautaire” have not been undertaken, especially in the domain of the 
Internal Market.  
In spite of the development of European Security and Defense Policy with its 
headline goal that by 2003 the EU should be able to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 persons for 
a sustained operation of one year or more, EU membership does not offer the same level 
                                                 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania: http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/dosare.nsf/Integrare 
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of security as that enjoyed by NATO members. An aggression against an EU state does 
not produce a reaction from the Union as a whole. As yet, the EU does not have any 
military forces of its own, and there is no mutual defense obligation codified by treaty. 
Also, Romania has been ruled out of any possible adherence plan to the EU in the 
first wave of 2004. The most optimistic prediction is that Romania will join the EU in 
2007. That is, EU membership is viewed as a complementary process to NATO 
integration. 
2. Strategic Partnership 
A specific approach in overcoming security discrepancies in central and eastern 
countries is a bilateral relationship with a strategic partner. The main characteristic of the 
relation is the power asymmetry between them. Generally, the strong partner is a great 
power, an influential international actor, which can offer a certain range of security to its 
weak partner. Taking into consideration this feature, strategic partnership is a new kind of 
bandwagoning. Romania has tried to establish some strategic partnerships with the US, 
France, and Italy. 
The Romania-US Strategic Partnership is the most important and it represents a 
coordination framework agreed upon by both countries in order to achieve certain major 
common goals, marking up the maturity level of their bilateral relationship in accordance 
with the special role mutually granted by each country within their foreign policy 
priorities. 
The Concept of the Strategic Partnership was launched in 1997, during the visit in 
Romania of Mr. William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. 
The main objectives of this partnership coordination framework are: developing 
bilateral economic and political cooperation; supporting Romanian efforts towards the 
NATO and EU accession; increasing the Romanian contribution to the Central and 
South-Eastern Europe security; strengthening Romanian democracy; and gaining 
American support in order to speed up the economic reform process in Romania. 
The intensified stage of the Strategic Partnership was launched during the visit to 
Bucharest of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering 
(February 2000). The "Intensified Strategic Partnership Framework" sets forth priorities 
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and objectives of the strategic fields belonging to the bilateral cooperation: economy, 
military, regional stability and non-traditional threats.  
The main features of the intensified stage of the Strategic Partnership are: 
· A focus on the economic dimension and the identification and implementation 
of concrete projects of common interest; 
· Pragmatism in defining and carrying out the commonly agreed objectives, 
particularly those ones with regional resonance.  
Strategic Partnership carries some advantages in the economic and political 
domains of security, but it does not offer any guarantees in the event of either conflict 
problems or aggression.  
3. Regional Cooperation 
Romania has developed two forms of regional cooperation: trilateral cooperation 
and sub-regional cooperation. 
Trilateral cooperation represents a flexible form of sub-regional cooperation, 
which develops according to the principles and in the fields commonly agreed by the 
participating states. The objectives, fields of cooperation, mechanisms, legal framework 
and degree of institutionalization differ, depending on the interests and practices of 
member states.  
Since the sub-regional cooperation is regarded as an indispensable component of 
the European and Euro-Atlantic integration process, and not as an alternative to it, the 
trilateral cooperation has favorable effects for Romania, within the process of integration 
in NATO, and for its affirmation as a stability factor in the region. 
The specific objectives of these forms of cooperation belong to the political, 
economic and social fields, and make it possible to realize the advantages resulting from 
the geographic proximity, the complementarity of the national economies, and some 
cooperative traditions. 
Romania participates in the following initiatives of trilateral cooperation: 
· Romania – Bulgaria - Greece 
· Romania – Bulgaria - Turkey 
· Romania – Hungary - Austria 
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· Romania – Poland - Ukraine 
· Romania - Republic of Moldova – Ukraine 
Sub-regional cooperation has as a basis a wide area of preoccupations, essentially 
linked with the security and stability of the South-East European region, its economic 
development on the whole, and the formation of a new philosophy of multidimensional 
cooperation in the spirit of a new identity oriented toward the common values of 
democracy and market economy, which characterize the European and Euro-Atlantic 
societies. 
The sub-regional cooperation initiatives in which Romania participates are the 
following: 
· South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) 
· South-East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI)  
· Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)  
· Priorities of Romania’s Chairmanship- in-Office of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Organization (BSEC)  
· Central European Initiative (CEI)3 
The main function of these initiatives, beyond cooperation and creating a good 
neighborhood, is to create a path towards better-structured, more powerful and efficient 
organizations, especially regarding security. They have a temporary character and their 
role is to carry Romania to the target institution. As in the Visegrad case4, after Romania 
will join NATO and EU, some of these initiatives will disappear. 
4. Neutrality 
Romania’s security status is that of de facto neutrality, imposed by external 
circumstances. Romania evolved in the field of national security from a formal status of 
ally in the Warsaw Treaty Organization to that of candidate for NATO accession. A 
                                                 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania: http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/politica.nsf/Teme 
4 Visegrad states: The Czech Republic, Slovakia (together Czechoslovakia until 1993), Hungary and 
Poland, formerly satellites of the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact, which met at Visegrad in 
1991 and agreed to cooperate in seeking membership of NATO and the EU as a route to total integration 
into Western Europe. All four countries are members of the Council of Europe and have Association 
Agreements. 
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second, deeper level of analysis indicates an evolution from isolation and quasi-autarky 
towards quasi-neutrality. 
Romania’s military doctrine, still an informal document, does not identify any 
enemy explicitly. Instead, the law of national security calls for protection touts azimuths - 
the enemy could be everywhere (even if none is explicitly identified). Consequently as a 
neutral state, Romania protects itself against external threats that could emerge from any 
direction. 
The military neutrality of the region that separated NATO from the ex-USSR on 
the model of Finland and Austria during the Cold War, was the first solution considered 
in the West before the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). 
This kind of security status creates political consequences/constraints for the 
states that adopt it. Among them the most important would be: 
· the state in case is not hostile to either part in conflict;  
· it refrains from openly criticizing them;  
· it develops a strictly defensive posture, with a low military potential; and 
· it can afford the defense expenditures for its own security. 
Besides, the great powers’ agreement is necessary. Otherwise one can end up in a 
situation of legal neutrality which is not respected in practice. Romania’s history provides 
a very good counterargument for neutrality. Same as at the beginning of the 1’st World 
War, Romania declared neutrality in 1939 when the 2’nd World War began. But the 
country was mutilated by the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov pact against Romania (taking 
away Bassarabia, Bukovina and Hertza land), with Bulgaria taking over Southern 
Dobrogea, and part of Transylvania being ceded to Hungary as an award following the 
Vienna dictate. A military government was formed and General Ion Antonescu was the 
head of it. In a desperate try to get back the lost provinces, he joined the Axis in the war 
against Russia (Soviet Union). 
5. Alliance with Russia 
This alternative, as strange as it may sound, was mentioned several times during 
the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. The creation of an alliance consisting of Russia, 
Ukraine and Yugoslavia appeared in some newspapers but was immediately rejected by 
the Romanian officials. 
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In the Romanian political perception after 1989, Russia's image remained that of a 
power so overwhelmingly great and uncontrollable for a country with the size and force 
of Romania that the best reaction one could have is the policy of the ostrich: head in the 
sand. The historical tradition, the repeated invasions, the humiliating wresting of 
Bessarabia and North Bucovina in 1940, the bringing in of communism, all this mingled 
to define a relation of Romania to Russia driven by a more or less irrational fear, by 
clichés, by inhibitions and complexes. As Romania perceives itself more and more as a 
European political actor does, a change of attitude towards Russia is likely to follow. It 
would be a first signal for Romania to defeat the complex of the small actor and 
overcome problems in issues of external political identity. But from here to an alliance 
with Russia is too big a step and for most of the Romanians is impossible to imagine.  
B. NATO MEMBERSHIP 
Even though some of the alternatives, such as EU integration, strategic 
partnership, and regional cooperation are not excluded by NATO membership having 
them as a matter of choice, we can now try to find an answer to the question: Why is 
Romania interested in NATO membership? 
Geographically, Romania lays in Central Europe, equidistant between the Atlantic 
and Urals Mountains. Its Latin language and cultural heritage-connected to the 
Mediterranean civilization, with ancient Greece and Rome-are part of Europe. The 
Romanian political and intellectual elite, educated in the 19th and 20th centuries in Paris, 
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, always defined their identity with reference to the values, 
ideas, and developments of Western Europe. The adoption of the first modern Romanian 
constitution in 1923 provided for a multi-party political system, separation of powers, and 
universal vote. The Romanian cultural avant-garde artists studied and performed in 
Western Europe and United States. They were inspired by the Western culture and 
contributed to it as well. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet occupation cruelly 
diverted Romania from its natural evolution. There were moments during the Soviet 
domination when ideals, associated with fundamental freedoms and Western identity, 
influenced most of the citizens. In the late 1950’s and 1960’s, Romania was the first 
country in the Soviet bloc to develop economic, technological and cultural relations with 
12 
Western countries and to establish diplomatic relations with Western Germany. In 1968, 
Romania was the only Warsaw Pact member that refused to take part in invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and condemned the Soviet-led crushing of the Prague Spring. 
At the grassroots level, ordinary Romanians, especially the younger generation, 
had a great appetite for freedom, nourished by the symbols of the Western culture: 
Western music, movies and also by Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. It is not by 
chance that it was the young generation who took to the streets in December 1989 and 
shed their blood for the triumph of freedom, generating dramatic changes in Romania.  
The communist regime in Romania fell in December 1989. This opened the path 
for Romania’s return to the community of democratic nations. Immediately, the country 
readopted traditional state symbols to link them with the national heritage - the flag, the 
coat-of-arms and a national anthem generated by the democratic changes in the 19th 
century. A new Constitution, enacted in 1991, became the backbone of a society based on 
a pluralist political system, fundamental freedoms, respect for minorities, and division of 
power among legislative, executive and judicial branches.  
In economic terms, 75% of our trade is with the European Union and the United 
States. Hundreds of Romanian students study abroad, most of them in the United States. 
Romania wants to project its Western identity not only internally, but also as an 
active participant in the international politics. The desire to join NATO does not come 
merely from a wish to enjoy the security umbrella of the alliance. The Romanian people 
want not only to share the values of Western community, but also to defend these values, 
shoulder to shoulder with NATO allies. Four years after Romania missed out on NATO's 
first eastward enlargement, Romanians remain overwhelmingly in favor of joining the 
alliance. In March 2001, as much as 85 percent of the population wants Romania in 
NATO5 -- a level of support greater than in any other Eastern candidate country, a 
statistic that the most likely candidates for entry, the Baltic states and Slovenia, can only 
dream of. 
Romania became active in international peacekeeping missions in 1991, when it 
participated in the Gulf War, after endorsing, as a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council, the UN decision to fight the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Also, it participated in 
                                                 
5 Radio Free Europe: Eugen Tomiuc, “Romania: Analysts Question Chances For NATO Membership”. 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/03/16032001112437.asp 
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peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Angola, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo. Table 1 
provides detailed information about Romanian military contribution to such missions 
form 1990 to 2002. 
Country Mission Period Forces 
Angola UNAVEM III 1995 - 1998 980
Albania ALBA 1997 400
Bosnia IFOR 1996 200
Bosnia SFOR 1996-2002 550
Bosnia SFOR 1996-2002 820
Kosovo KVM 1999-2002 1
Kosovo UNMIK 1999-2002 1
Kosovo KFOR 2000-2002 105
Ethiopia - Eritreea UNMEE 1990-2002 8
Georgia - 1999-2002 2
Iraq - Kuwait UNIKOM 1991-2002 5
Congo MONUC 1999-2002 19
Table 1: Romania’s Participation in NATO/UN Operations6 
 
Today, Romania is a functioning pluralistic democracy with the main instruments 
of a market economy already in place and a substantial growth potential. The Romanian 
Government is committed to a radical economic reform program which seeks to give a 
new impetus to economic growth, to fight against poverty and unemployment, to rebuild 
the state institution’s authority, to reduce the bureaucracy, to enhance the fight against 
corruption and criminality, and to continue and speed up the process of integration into 
the EU and NATO. 
The progress achieved so far in consolidating the democracy and the state of law 
emphasizes that Romania has assimilated and promotes the democratic principles and the 
values shared by all NATO member states. The irreversibility of this trend will be 
confirmed through Romania’s integration into NATO.  
                                                 
6 The Romanian Ministry of National Defense: http://www.mapn.ro/ 
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The democratic transfer of authority following the legislative and presidential 
elections which took place in 1996 and 2000 represents another proof of the maturity of 
the political establishment and for the public level of participation in the democratic 
process. 
15 
III. NATO MAIN MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its CEE communist satellites, 
NATO defied all realist assumptions about alliances dissolving in the absence of a threat. 
It made instead a series of steps that allowed it to remain more significant than the OSCE 
and WEU and move again, within just a decade, to the core of the European security 
system. Through a series of processes and transformations, NATO has succeeded in 
remaining a stable and important security organization. After taking a vacillating start at 
the beginning of the 90s, NATO has been gradually accelerating the tempo by launching 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, opening the door to the first three CEE 
members in 1997, initiating its first out-of-area missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and 
preparing itself for a next round of enlargement in 2002.7 
In order to observe NATO’s influence on domestic actors responsible for national 
security elaboration and implementation, a chronological description of the development 
of NATO’s main instruments for dealing with new aspirant countries - North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the New 
Strategic Concept, and Membership Action Plan - is necessary. Once a country is 
connected with this multitude of structures, organizations and programs, there is not 
much room left for other alternatives than to conform to the system that NATO has 
created. 
A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL 
NATO reacted to the events of 1989 by extending a hand of friendship to six 
former Warsaw Pact members – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania 
and the Soviet Union – at the London Summit in July 1990. NATO invited these 
countries to visit Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Alliance 
further extended an invitation to these governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison 
and intensify military contacts with NATO. In the words of NATO’s London 
Declaration:  
We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have 
enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an 
                                                 
7 Corneliu Bjola, NATO as a Factor of Security Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central 
and Eastern Europe , p.15 
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agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united 
continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared 
faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution 
of disputes.8 
 
A year later at the Rome summit in November 1991, NATO took a further step by 
adopting a new Strategic Concept and establishing a more direct relationship with the 
CEE countries through the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
In their November 1991 November Strategic Concept, the Allies recalled the Alliance’s 
two classic purposes, as follows: “safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its 
members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.”9 Also, the 
document acknowledged that: 
Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression 
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse 
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, 
social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe.10 
 
As a result, Allied security policy would henceforth be based on “three mutually 
reinforcing elements . . . dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective 
defense capability. The dual approach of dialogue and defense was expanded into a triad 
of cooperation, dialogue, and defense.”11 
The NACC was designed to go beyond military contacts and regular diplomatic 
liaison and to provide a formal mechanism through which CEE countries could consult 
with NATO on various political and security issues.12 Until its replacement in May 1997 
with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NACC grew up to include 38 
members from CEE and former Soviet Union, and provided a multilateral forum for 
discussions, consultation and sharing of information with regard to a wide range of topics 
such as: political, economic, military and security related matters; defense planning and 
                                                 
8 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p.73 
9 “The Alliance Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt , 1991 
10 Ibid. 
11 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p.74 
12 Declaration on Peace and Cooperation Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Including Decisions Leading to the Creation of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) (“The Rome Declaration”), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt , 1991 
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conversion issues; civil emergency planning and humanitarian assistance; peacekeeping; 
science; challenges of modern society; policy planning consultations; air traffic 
management, etc.13 
NACC’s core mission was to assist the partner countries to defuse their mutual 
security suspicions through a set of confidence-building measures and consultation 
mechanisms and by promoting a long-term understanding of national and multilateral 
security concerns.14 NACC activities consisted mainly of meetings – workshops, 
seminars, conferences, colloquiums, and so forth. However, NACC was not intended to 
provide a road map for NATO membership, nor to extend any security guaranties to the 
partner countries. NACC membership was limited from the outset to NATO and former 
adversaries (Warsaw Pact states and their successors) because it was conceived as a 
means to overcome the divisive legacy of the Cold War. Changing international 
conditions and growing pressure from the CEE countries in the direction of deeper 
political and military cooperation pushed NATO to design a mechanism able to strike a 
balance between the security concerns of the aspirant countries and those of Russia, while 
at the same time to keep NATO in control over the political decision and timelines of the 
enlargement process. 
B. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE 
The Partnership for Peace was first proposed by US Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in 
October 1993; it was formally approved three months later, at NATO’s January 1994 
Brussels summit.  
The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. 
The Partnership for Peace Invitation was addressed to all states participating in the 
NACC and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) able and willing to cont ribute to the program. The invitation has since 
been accepted by a total of 30 countries. Its purposes were defined as follows: 
At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the 
individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards 
                                                 
13 “Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation”, http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm 
14 Sean Key, NATO and the Future of European Security, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, 
p.66 
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transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of 
defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an 
ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search 
and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.15 
 
In strategic terms, PfP served three main goals for the Alliance: it established a 
process with membership as a target for some partners; it allowed for self-differentiation 
among partner states without extending the full benefits of NATO membership to the 
partners; and it supported the Alliance’s mission of exporting stability as envisioned in 
the 1991 Strategic Concept. At the same time, the partner countries interested in 
membership were given more access to NATO’s political and military bodies and were 
offered a flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond the soft dialogue 
and cooperation framework institutionalized by the NACC. As for their main concern, the 
PfP invitation made clear that active participation in the Partnership for Peace would play 
an important role in the evolutionary process of expansion of NATO, but the degree of 
involvement in PfP was voluntarily, at a pace and scope decided by each Partner. The 
diplomatic language of the initial documents and meetings satisfied every actor, no 
matter how different its attitude towards NATO enlargement. The ambiguity over what a 
vague open-door statement meant is what created support for PfP program. Those 
opposed to NATO expansion believed that promoting PfP would leave any decisions on 
enlargement for later. Those in the middle were comfortable with signaling that an 
eventual expansion was favored but nothing concrete had been done. Finally, proponents 
for enlargement were pleased since they believed that such a statement would help to 
move the process along. 16 
The PfP program focuses on defense-related cooperation to forge a real 
partnership between each Partner country and NATO. It has become an important and 
permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to expand and 
intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. The program is helping to 
increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security 
relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles 
which underpin the Alliance. In accordance with the PfP Framework Document, 
                                                 
15 North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par.4 
16 James M. Goldgeier, Not  Whether But When – The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1999, p41-42 
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NATO undertakes to consult with any active Partner if that Partner 
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, 
or security. 17 
 
In practical terms, PfP set out an important agenda, covering five major areas. 
First, it made participation to the program contingent upon adherence of the partner 
countries to the Partnership main values: protection and promotion of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through 
democracy. In addition, the partner countries were asked to commit themselves 
To refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to 
settle disputes by peaceful means [and] to fulfill in good faith the 
obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights [as well as] the Helsinki Final 
Act and all subsequent CSCE documents.18 
 
The Framework Document included specific undertakings to be made by each 
participant to cooperate with NATO in fulfilling the objectives of the program as a 
whole. They are as follows:  
· to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes;  
· to ensure democratic control of defense forces;  
· to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations 
under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of 
the OSCE;  
· to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose 
of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the 
ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of 
peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others 
as may subsequently be agreed; and 
· to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate 
with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.19 
 
Second, the PfP established a concrete and structured program of political and 
military collaboration consisting of: 
                                                 
17 NATO Handbook, Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1999, p. 87 




a) The preparation and implementation of NAC 16 + 1 Partner Individual 
Partnership Programs (IPP) listing the necessary steps for promoting 
transparency in defense planning and budgeting, for ensuring the democratic 
control of armed forces, for identifying the financial, personnel, military and 
other assets that might be used for Partnership activities, as well as for 
carrying out the PfP agreed exercises in the fields of peacekeeping, search and 
rescue, and humanitarian operations. The selection of activities is made by 
each Partner separately, on the basis of its individual requirements and 
priorities. This principle of self-differentiation is an important aspect of PfP 
which recognizes that the needs and situations of each Partner country vary 
and that it is for each one of them to identify the forms of activity and 
cooperation most suited to their needs;20 
b) Establishing permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination 
Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, that would have access to certain NATO 
technical data and standardized agreements (STANAGS) relevant to the 
interoperability and who would be in charge of carrying out the military 
planning necessary to implement the Partnership programs;21 
c) Developing a Planning and Review Process (PARP) intended to simulate the 
NATO defense planning process and aimed at providing a basis for 
identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available 
by partner countries for multinational training, exercises, and operations in 
conjunction with Alliance forces.22 The activities were initially derived from 
45 generic Interoperability Objectives (IO) which covered areas relating to the 
full spectrum of Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Aid, acting as 
PFP “Force Goals”; 
d) The joint preparation by NATO and the partner countries of the Partnership 
Work Program (PWP), serving as the basic menu for the preparation of the 
yearly IPP and listing 21 activities –from Air Defense and Crisis Management 
                                                 
20 NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm 




to Military Geography and Language Training – offered by NATO bodies 
(HQ, staffs, agencies or schools), NATO nations and Partner nations in the 
framework of PfP.23 The PWP consisted basically of two main sections: the 
Generic section laid down the general areas in which Partners should strive to 
achieve interoperability, the Specific section laid down the next year’s 
program of activities.24 
Third, besides its regularly scheduled peacekeeping exercises and seminars, the 
PfP allowed partner countries to gain operational experience in the NATO command 
structure by taking part in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and then Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia. By June 1996, 12 PfP countries, including Romania, 
joined NATO forces in Bosnia, adding nearly 10,000 personnel to IFOR. 25 IFOR and 
SFOR operations had a positive contribution to the PfP process by making clear the 
strengths and weaknesses of coordinating a multinational operation in this new context, 
and by highlighting several critical interoperability problems for the partner countries in 
terms of military planning, resource allocation, language training, and communication 
equipment. 
Fourth, the PfP served as an important conceptual and operational blueprint for 
most of the ensuing discussions concerning NATO enlargement. Thus, NATO’s 1995 
Study on Enlargement reiterated the political objectives of the Alliance as stated in the 
PfP Framework Document and called upon prospective members to: 
· Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;  
· Accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together 
for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security, with 
each nation contributing to the security and defense from which all 
member nations benefit; and 
                                                 
23 Partnership Work Programme  for 2000-200: http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990616a.htm 
24 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), “Guide to Partnership for Peace (PfP)” 
25 SHAPE, “Implementation Force”, http://www.shape.naro.int/PFP/impforc1.htm 
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· Be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings 
included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.26 
 
Moreover, the study insisted that in the process of preparation for membership 
“premature development of measures outside PfP for possible new members should be 
avoided.”27 Consequently, the PfP was confirmed as the key instrument to be used by the 
candidate countries to streamline their political and military preparation for NATO 
membership. 
Finally, the PfP created the premises for a timely exposure of several 
shortcomings hindering NATO’s multinational coordination efforts. It has been thus 
argued that PfP unintentionally encouraged CEE countries to compete against each other 
at the expense of their bilateral relations, that it favored military-to-military cooperation 
with the potential to undermine the civil- military reforms in the region, that it led PfP 
countries to stress quantity over quality in their programs, that it promoted only limited 
transparency, and, that it deflected the military preparation of the partner countries from 
more traditional sources of threat.28 In order to address better these issues, the June 1997 
meeting in Sintra, Portugal agreed on a new set of proposals to further enhance PfP and 
NACC. 
C. THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) 
Given the predominant military dimension of the PfP, the perceived inefficiency 
of NACC, and the determination to keep politically connected those partner countries that 
were not interested in NATO membership and those interested but not yet selectable, the 
Sintra ministerial meeting and the subsequent Madrid summit decided to raise to a 
qualitatively new level the political and military cooperation between NATO and the 
partner countries by establishing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as the 
successor to NACC, and by enhancing the PfP.29 The EAPC was thus designed to 
increase the participation of the partner countries in the decision-making and consultation 
                                                 
26“Study on NATO Enlargement”, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9506.htm 
27 Ibid. 
28 Sean Kay, “NATO and The Future of European Security”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Hardback. 
1998, p 73-73 
29 “Basic Document of the Euro -Atlantic Partnership Council”, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt  
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process and to expand the scope of political and security-related issues to be discussed 
within its framework. 
The key elements of its structure consisted of: 
a) regular meetings at the ambassadorial and ministerial level; 
b) closer cooperation with the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), 
the Political Committee (PC), and the Military Committee (MC); and 
c) a four-tiered Action Plan that included PWP and previous NACC issue areas, 
Civil Emergency planning and disaster preparedness, PfP areas of 
cooperation, and short-term planning for EAPC consultations and practical 
cooperation. 30 
One of the political goals has been to transform EAPC into a NATO body capable 
of preventing the next “out of area” regional crisis by enhancing PfP’s emphasis on crisis 
management, counterterrorism, and disaster response. 
At the operational level, following the more formal 1996 PfP Enhancement 
program, the enhanced PfP stipulated several changes: 
a) to foster greater regional cooperation and participation, including in the 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), through regional peace enforcement and 
crisis management exercises; 
b) to increase partner access to NATO procedures and documents beyond PCC 
by creating Partnership for Peace Staff Elements (PSEs) at the first and second 
level of NATO integrated military structure; and 
c) to expand PARP to encourage partner states to adopt a new system of defense 
planning, create local defense policy experts, increase interoperability 
standards, and define a genuine mechanism of feedback between NATO and 
its partners. 
Prior to the admission into the Alliance of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic and reinforced at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the intensified dialogue 
process (IDP) was offered to all aspirant countries to NATO membership as a 
supplementary element to assist their preparation and keep them engaged in the PfP. 
                                                 
30 “The Birth and Development of the EAPC Idea”, http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc.htm 
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Primarily focused on political factors, IDP was scheduled to take place biannually at the 
level of the NAC+1 Partner, plus an additional dialogue conducted by a NATO team. 
Growing concern for enhancing interoperability between NATO members and the 
partner countries and for preserving the military effectiveness of the Alliance resulted in 
new sets of recommendations. Thus, the Concept for Implementation of PfP published in 
May 1996 identified what was meant by interoperability and how to build a program to 
support the achievement of interoperability. The Concept worked within and 
supplemented PARP and it embedded two levels of interoperability: 
· Interoperability Requirements (MIR) – 26 broad statements of those areas in 
which Partners should achieve interoperability in order to be better able to 
operate with NATO; 
· Tasks for Interoperability (MTI) - detailed tasks identified by the MNCs as 
being necessary to achieve each MIR. 31 
In June 1998, the EAPC Defense Ministerial meeting agreed to develop new 
procedures that would expand and adapt the PARP in order to make it resemble more 
closely with NATO Defense Planning Process. The new procedures included the addition 
of PARP Ministerial Guidance, Partnership Goals and the extension of the planning 
horizon to six years. The new Partnership Goals (PO) were intended to replace by 2000 
the previous Interoperability Objectives (IOs), to enhance Alliance’s capacity to operate 
in non-Article 5 crisis management situations, to assist the partners in developing 
interoperable capabilities, and to better help the aspiring countries for membership. 
D. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
In line with the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the first 
post-Cold War decade, the 1999 NATO New Strategic Concept acknowledged that the 
risks to the security of the Alliance “are multi-directional and often difficult to predict.”32 
Besides nuclear proliferation and less likely large-scale conventional aggression or 
nuclear attack, they include: 
                                                 
31  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), “Guide to Partnership for Peace PfP”, 
http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP.HTM 
32 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm 
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uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the 
possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could 
evolve rapidly. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, 
inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the 
dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. 33 
 
In order to address these sources of insecurity, the Alliance committed itself to a multi-
dimensional approach that included political, economic, social and environmental factors 
in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. Hence, the fundamental security tasks 
to be performed are: a) security, based on the growth of democratic institutions; b) 
consultation as provided by Article 4 of the Washington Treaty; c) traditional deterrence 
and defense; d) crisis management; and e) partnership.34 
Given the interoperability problems revealed during its intervention in Kosovo, 
NATO supplemented its 1999 Strategic Concept with two new initiatives. The first one, 
the Defense Capabilities Initiative, was primarily targeted at the Alliance members and 
set as its objective the improvement of defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of 
future NATO-led multinational operations, especially those outside the territory of the 
Alliance. A temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) was put in charge of 
overseeing the implementation of the DCI.35 The second initiative, the Operational 
Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations (OCC), was designed to improve the 
interoperability between Allied and Partner forces and increase their ability to operate 
together in future NATO-led PfP operations. To reach this goal, OCC made provisions 
for five sets of mechanisms: a) Pool(s) of Forces and Capabilities; b) Established 
Multinational Formations; c) Peacetime Working Relationships; d) Assessment and 
Feedback Mechanisms; and e) Enabling Mechanisms.36 In addition, OCC took also into 
account improvements to PfP Training and Education, as well as to multi-nationality in 
the command and operational structure. 
 
                                                 
33 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm 
34 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm 
35 “Defense Capabilities Initiative”, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm 
36 "Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century: Appendix D - Operational Capabilities Concept for 
NATO-led PfP Operations", http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615e.htm 
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E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN 
The most recent and probably the most comprehensive and important NATO 
document governing the relationships with the CEE aspiring countries is the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) approved at the NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999. At the 
same meeting, Allied leaders promised that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
would not be the last new countries to join NATO and stated that the enlargement process 
would be reviewed in 2002. Building on the Intensified Individual Dialogue on 
membership questions, MAP was designed to reinforce the Open Door policy of the 
Alliance and its firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a program 
of activities to assist the aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future 
membership. While stressing that the list of issues included did not constitute criteria, 
guarantees nor a timeframe for membership, MAP required each aspiring country to draw 
up an annual national program containing specific information and implementation 
measures with regard to five chapters: 
a) Political and Economic issues: These include settling any international, ethnic 
or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a 
commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic 
control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through 
economic liberty, social justice, environmental responsibility, commitment to 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, etc.; 
b) Defense and Military issues: enhance interoperability and PARP, adopt the 
new Strategic concept, and provide forces and capabilities for collective 
defense and other Alliance missions; 
c) Resource allocation able to meet defense priorities and participation in 
Alliance structures; 
d) Security issues concerning the safeguards and procedures to ensure the 
protection of the most sensitive information; and 
e) Legal issues: incorporation of NATO’s “acquis” - legal arrangements and 
agreements which govern cooperation within the Alliance.37 
                                                 
37“NATO’s Membership Action Plan”, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm, 2000 
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The MAP comprises the following elements: 
· Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national program on its 
preparations for possible membership, covering the five chapters mentioned 
above. This program should set objectives and targets on all issues relevant to 
membership. It should also provide specific information on steps being taken, 
responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific 
aspects.  
· A focused feedback mechanism on progress made by each aspirant on its 
programs is established to provide both political and technical advice. 
Meetings takes place in a 19+1 format with the NAC and other NATO bodies 
if requested, and with a NATO Team. The NATO Team will include 
specialists on the specific subjects to be discussed from NATO's International 
Staff, the International Military Staff, and the NATO Major Commands. 
Feedback and advice on MAP issues is provided through mechanisms based 
on those currently in use with Partners (for instance in the PfP framework), as 
well as 19+1 meetings and NATO Team workshops. The workshops are 
particularly valuable, as they enable in-depth discussion among experts on the 
entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership.  
· Annual clearinghouse meetings with each aspirant at 19+1 help dovetail 
bilateral and multilateral assistance in the defense/military field to the country 
concerned with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness of assistance 
programs.  
· Planning targets are elaborated with aspiring countries to cover the areas most 
directly relevant to nations seeking to align their force structures and 
capabilities with the responsibilities involved in eventual Alliance 
membership. These are built on existing Partnership Goals and are be subject 
to review, allowing for detailed feedback.38 
Each spring, the Alliance draws up a report for individual aspirants providing 
feedback focused on their progress in the areas covered in their individual national 
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programs. This document forms the basis for an annual spring meeting of the NAC with 
each individual aspirant. 
The MAP does not replace the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In fact, 
participation in PfP for aspiring countries remains essential, as it provides a well-
established way of developing progressive interoperability with Alliance forces. 
Moreover, the Washington Summit put into place a coherent package of measures for a 
more operational Partnership, to strengthen the ability of Allies and all Partner countries, 
including membership aspirants, to work together. The provisions of the MAP 
complement these activities available under PfP by addressing the broader spectrum of 
preparations required for eventua l membership. 
The MAP provides aspiring countries with a variety of opportunities. It is up to 
them to select and make use of elements of the MAP at their discretion. Like PfP, the 
MAP is guided by the principle of self-differentiation. Aspirants are free to match their 
participation with their own national priorities and circumstances and to decide upon their 
own implementation measures and timetables. They set their own objectives, targets and 
work schedules. These programs are expected to be updated each year but can be 
amended at any time. NATO is following the progress made by each aspirant and 
providing political and technical advice. MAP makes also reference to screening 
mechanisms in 19+1 format, which are intended to provide constant feedback and advice 
to the aspirant countries. The Alliance set formal provisions for preparing an annual 
report that helps aspirant countries identify areas for further action, but it leaves at their 
discretion the level of commitment for taking further action. 
The implementation of the MAP has also ceased to be a matter concerning only 
ministries of foreign affairs and defense. With the establishment of inter-ministerial 
meetings at the national level, fulfilling the objectives of the Plan is increasingly 
engaging other government departments in a coordinated and systematic effort. 
Like most of its neighbors, Romania suffers from a myriad of history- induced 
anxieties, phobias, and national ego problems, accentuated by its position at the 
crossroads of Western, Slavic, and Middle Eastern cultures. There is the fear of Russia 
threatening the country and of Hungarians plotting to reconquer Transylvania; the 
constant feeling of victimization, of being stabbed in the back or played as a pawn by the 
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big powers; and above all, there is the insatiable desire to be considered an equal to 
Western nations--as civilized, as advanced, and as "good" as they are.  
NATO membership is also considered an economic issue in Romania. The 
expectation is that membership would bring an influx of foreign investments that would 
help today's sluggish, still reforming economy. Even in this time of economic hardship, 
Romanians are not deterred from accepting higher military costs to enter NATO, 
precisely because they expected an economic payoff in return.  
In 1990, Romania was one of the six countries invited to establish regular 
diplomatic liaison with NATO and intensify military contact, it was the first to join PfP, 
it has been very active in the program, and it followed sincerely the main requirements of 
the program. These include democratic elections, individual liberty, and the rule of law; 
demonstrated commitment to economic reform and market economy; adherence to OSCE 
norms and principles involving ethnic minorities and social justice; resolution of 
territorial disputes with neighbors; and the establishment of democratic control of the 
military. In order to overcome all the obstacles a political consensus was necessary. The 
Snagov Agreement, signed by all political parties represented in Parliament of 1995, is 
the document which shows Romania’s commitment for NATO membership and national 
consensus in the topic. 
The restructuring of the Armed Forces was always connected with NATO’s 
Interoperability Objectives and later on Partnership Goals. The centerpiece of Romania’s 
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IV. ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS 
Drawing on the overview of the post Cold War evolution of NATO’s relationship 
with the CEE countries as outlined in the previous section, this chapter and the next one 
will make an assessment of the institutional and normative effects entailed by this 
relationship on Romanian national security. This chapter focuses on Romania’s relations 
with Hungary, while the next chapter examines the defense budget and downsizing the 
military personnel as two major aspects of a larger process-the restructuring of the 
Romanian Armed Forces. 
Given the historical pattern of distrust and rivalry between Romania and Hungary, 
the expectation of traditional perspectives, which doubt the ability of international 
institutions to influence state behavior on major security concerns, would be that 
NATO’s pressure has had only a limited impact of the bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Evidence to the contrary will give credit to the idea that NATO’s multilateral 
strategy has eventually paid off, and Romanian-Hungarian relations are currently 
experiencing a dynamic process of building trust, cooperation and good neighbor 
relations. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS 
Following the collapse of the communist regimes, the relationship between the 
two countries as it emerged between 1990 and 1994 was that between two moderately 
nationalist states. However, the continuing deterioration of the Hungarian-Romanian 
relationship before 1994 was stopped and reversed by the launch of the Partnership for 
Peace program and the subsequent NATO engagement programs. PfP offered an 
excellent window of opportunity for non-nationalist political forces from both countries 
to take control over the bilateral normalization process and put it on an ascendant course. 
Despite ongoing political frictions, it is probably safe to assume that in absence of 
NATO’s partnership programs, the political tensions between Romania and Hungary 
would have been deeper and would have required more time as well as more domestic 
and international efforts to heal. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the political transition of Romania to democracy proved 
difficult, unstable and occasionally tragic. The initial diplomatic breakthrough and 
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international sympathy attained immediately after the violent overthrow of the 
communist regime in December 1989 had evaporated within only six months as a result 
of successive brutal assaults on the political opposition and intellectuals, executed by 
miner squads summoned up and organized by the first post-communist president Ion 
Iliescu and his ruling party. The bloody ethnic clash between Romanians and ethnic 
Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures, Romania, in March 1990 revealed deep-rooted ethnic 
tensions and sent a chill through both parties as well as the Western European 
community. The country’s international standing was further weakened by the political 
coalition the Iliescu government formed between 1992 and 1996 with two extremist, 
ultra-nationalist parties well known for their aggressive rhetoric targeted at the Hungarian 
and Roma minorities.39 
Incapable of change and democratic adaptation, the ruling political elite found 
increasing refuge in nationalistic and anti-Western rhetoric. In the words of an influential 
Iliescu official and then Minister of Defense, the sole explanation for the critical 
problems facing the country could be found in international conspiracies, implicitly 
orchestrated by Hungary: 
Soon, the old web of international isolation was reactivated, as if someone 
somewhere became frightened by the advantage Romania might obtain 
given its relatively large potential compared to the other East European 
countries.40 
 
These statements were echoed by the first post-communist National Security 
Doctrine, submitted to the Parliament for approval in September 1994, which besides 
“revisionist tendencies” included references to the dangers posed by “distorted 
perceptions” of Romania’s internal evolution in other countries.41 The ambiguous 
commitment toward full political and economic reform, the “suspect ideological baggage 
and questionable political behavior of the Iliescu regime,”42 as well as the strained 
                                                 
39 For more details on this topic see, Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceausescu, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1995 
40 Ioan Mircea Pascu, “Romania’s Response to a Restructured World”, in Daniel N. Nelson, Romania 
After Tyranny, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p.277 
41 Romanian Ministry of Defense, Conceptia Integrata privind Securitatea nationala a Romaniei , draft 
submitted for approval to the Romanian Parliament, Sept. 1994 
42 Ronald H. Lynden, “After the Revolution: A Foreign Policy of Bounded Change” in Daniel N. Nelson, 
Romania After Tyranny, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p.222 
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political relations with neighboring countries (Hungary and to a lesser extent Bulgaria) all 
contributed before the 1996 elections to placing Romania in an international quasi-
quarantine. 
In the case of Hungary, the process of internalization of a cooperative and 
democratic set of norms of international conduct has been taking place faster and 
apparently more firmly than in Romania, but not without problems. The priorities of the 
Hungarian foreign policy during the 1990s consisted in pursuing a dual track strategy: to 
become a full member of the Western community and to protect the rights of the 
Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. Tensions started to accumulate 
when the second foreign policy objective became framed into a public rhetoric that 
invoked historical memories of Greater Hungary. Thus, the first post-communist Prime 
Minister Joszef Antall declared in August 1990 that “he considered himself in spirit to be 
the Prime Minister of all 15 millions Hungarians,”43 including approximately five million 
ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, a declaration that triggered angry reactions 
among the neighboring countries and immediately attracted harsh international 
criticism. 44 
Another hotly debated action met with pressure by the Western European 
governments, especially Germany, was the decision of the Antall government to block 
Romania’s admittance to the Council of Europe until 1993, in order to force the 
Romanian government to improve the situation of the Hungarian minority. In addition, 
insistent appeals to granting collective rights, regional autonomy and self-government to 
the Hungarian ethnic communities from the region coupled with an ambiguous security 
policy on the question of borders, led the international community to conclude by 1994 
that Hungary was not contributing to stability in Central Europe but rather that it was 
undermining it, and hence it started to question the legitimacy of Hungarian membership 
in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.45 
                                                 
43 Kerry S. McNamara, “Hungary Between East and West: The Dilemma over Yugoslavia”, Case program 
– Kennedy School of Government, 1995 
44 Robert M. Bigler, “Back in Europe and Adjusting to the New Realities of the 1990 in Hungary”, East 
European Quarterly, vol. 30, Summer 96, Issue 2 
45 Pál Dunay, “Theological Debates on NATO in Hungary”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 3, Special Issue, 1997 
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As will be argued in more detail in the next sub-section, the Partnership for Peace 
program was launched at the moment when the political and military bilateral relations 
between Romania and Hungary were practically frozen. However, changing political 
conditions at the domestic level provided a window of opportunity for non-nationalist 
political forces to turn PfP into an efficient instrument for reducing the political tensions 
between the two countries and for improving the general stability of the region. Thus, the 
Hungarian social- liberal government elected in 1994 set as new political priorities: “... 
the process of accession to the EU and accession to NATO or creation of the 
opportunities for this. The government will subordinate everything else to this.”46 
Similarly, the governmental coalition of the new Romanian president Emil 
Constantinescu, which took power in November 1996 and which included the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) as one of its members, 
acknowledged that NATO “had a highly positive, perhaps even decisive, influence in 
stabilizing the Romanian-Hungarian relations” and promised to transform the bilateral 
relationship into a “hard core of stability in Central Europe.”47 
B. NATO ENGAGEMENT 
The strategic political objectives of NATO in relation with the aspirant countries 
have been consistently reiterated in all major statements and documents starting with the 
Rome Declaration in 1991, the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in 1994, the 
EAPC Basic Document in 1997, and finally the Membership Action Plan in April 1999. 
These objectives have been translated into practice through various partnership programs 
and have imposed serious constraints on the capacity of the candidate countries to go to 
war against each other. This proposition does not imply that Hungary and Romania have 
lost their military capacity to pursue war against each other as a consequence of their 
collaboration with NATO. It only contends that NATO’s institutional engagement with 
Hungary and Romania has substantively changed the terms of the bilateral framework 
between the two countries, by increasing institutional incentives for political and military 
cooperation. The validity of this claim can be examined in two steps. The first one 
                                                 
46 Gyula Horn, “Contribution to the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Parliament”, Current 
Policy, no. 3a, 1995 
47 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, “White Book on Romania and NATO”, 
http://kappa.ro/mae/ 
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explores the level of institutional engagement between NATO and the two countries, at 
both the political and military level. The second one assesses the impact of this variable 
on the Hungarian-Romanian bilateral relationship at the level of foreign and military-
defense policies. With regard to the first aspect, Tables 1 and 2 provide an evaluation of 
the degree of political and military institutional commitment between NATO and the two 
countries. 
 NACC PfP IID EAPC MAP 
Hungary X X X X - 
Romania X X X X X 
Table 2: Level of Political Engagement with NATO 
 
Following its admission into the Alliance in April 1999, Hungary entered a new 
phase of institutional engagement, a fact that explains the missing data from the 
corresponding MAP and Enhanced PfP columns. The two tables suggest that at both 
political and military level, the degree of institutiona l engagement between NATO and 
the two countries has been constantly high. The political rapprochement initiated by 
NATO in the early days of the 1990s toward the former Warsaw Treaty members has 
been steadily developing into a complex relationship of cooperation resting on solid 
political and military pillars. Moreover, both countries joined almost immediately all 
political initiatives and operational programs set forth by NATO and followed relatively 
closely the requirements for partnership and membership. Actually, NATO has had no 
problems in convincing the two countries to join its programs, but rather in 
accommodating their unrelenting demands for further political and military cooperation. 
PfP Enhanced PfP MAP48  




RCE D&M RA SI LM 
Hungary X X X X X - X X - - - - 
Romania X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Table 3: Level of Military Engagement with NATO 
 
                                                 
48 Refers to the military -related chapters of the annual national program: defense-military including the 
OCC concept, resource allocation, security information, and legal matters 
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While illustrative from a quantitative point of view, the two tables are 
unfortunately silent on the quality of the institutional engagement between NATO and the 
two countries. The expectation is that gradual convergence of the political and military 
directions of the two countries to NATO’s strategic objectives produces a positive 
boomerang effect on the relationship between Hungary and Romania. 
C. FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY DIRECTIONS 
Both countries emerged from the communist period with no clearly articulated 
foreign and military policies, except for two enthusiastic but nevertheless vague and 
contradictory ambitions: to integrate themselves as soon as possible into the Euro-
Atlantic political-military structures (NATO, EU, WEU, Council of Europe) and to 
uphold the nationalist basis of state power. It is actually the merit of NATO and the EU to 
channel the foreign and military policy efforts of both countries towards pursuing the first 
objective and to help prevent nationalist U-turns. The strong political and military 
engagement of both countries with NATO illustrated in Table 1 and 2 was paralleled by a 
four-stage evolution of the Romanian-Hungarian military and political relationship. First, 
the number of cooperation agreements (see Graph 1) between the two states increased 
steadily, especially after the launch of the PfP in January 1994 and the changes of 
government in Hungary and Romania in 1994 and 1996 respectively. 
Figure 1: Romanian-Hungarian Major Bilateral Agreements49 
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Second, under NATO/US pressure, political normalization followed suit with the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations 
(the Basic Treaty) in 1996, which besides guaranteeing the inviolability of borders and 
the territorial integrity of each party, stated provisions for regular consultations on issues 
concerning security, defense, regional stability and mutual support for integration into 
NATO, EU and WEU. 50 
Third, the previous adversarial stance has gradually given way after 1996 to a 
cooperative relationship resting on relatively strong institutional ties and improved policy 
coordination. A Joint Intergovernmental Commission for Cooperation and Active 
Partnership was established in October 1997 as a means to promote transparency, 
generate feedback and convey mutual assistance on all key bilateral issues, especially 
those related to Euro-Atlantic integration. In the military realm, a joint peacekeeping 
battalion composed of 500 soldiers from each country had been agreed upon in March 
1998 and became operational one year later, having as one of its missions the transfer of 
expertise that Hungary has gained from its recent NATO membership.51 
Figure 2: Romanian-Hungarian Official High-level Meetings52 
 
                                                 
50 "Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good 
Neighborhood", http://www.htmh.hu/dokumentumok/asz-ro -e.htm:1996: 
51 Stephen R. Burant, “After NATO Enlargement: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and the 
Problem of Further European Integration”, Problems of Post-Communism 48, 2 (March/April). p.37 
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Fourth, following the 1998 election of the conservative coalition in Hungary and 
the return to power of Iliescu’s party in Romania in November 2000 the level of bilateral 
contacts between the two countries has receded sharply (see Graph 2). However, neither 
the bilateral military relationship nor the general institutional setting presents yet visible 
signs of disruption, although this situation may reverse swiftly in the near future. It is 
nevertheless true that despite the general positive trend, the sound political and military 
engagement between NATO and the two countries has not been yet rendered into similar 
vigorous patterns of bilateral cooperation between Hungary and Romania. 
Table 3 provides grounds for optimism concerning the possibility of developing a 
security community in the CEE region. NATO’s robust political and military engagement 
with Hungary and Romania has proved indeed conducive to the improvement of the 
bilateral relationships between the two countries at the level of foreign and military 
policy directions. 
Subject Date 
1. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and 
Romania on the establishment of an Open Skies regime 
May 11, 
1991 
2. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and 
Romania on confidence- and security-building measures complementing 




3. Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on mutual 
understanding, cooperation and good-neighborliness (the Basic Treaty) 
September 
16, 1996 
4. Protocol between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and 
Romania on the establishment of an intergovernmental Joint Committee on 
cooperation and active partnership between the Republic of Hungary and 
Romania and its Terms of Reference 
March 10, 
1997 
5. Protocol on cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Hungary and Romania 
March 12, 
1997 
6. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and 
Romania on the establishment of a joint peacekeeping battalion 
March 20, 
1998 
Table 4: Romanian-Hungarian Major Political-military Agreements 
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The conclusion of the Basic Treaty has been followed by two concrete measures 
regarding the establishment of a joint committee of partnership and a joint peacekeeping 
battalion. Both of these two initiatives are animated by intense activity. 
The examination of the evolution of the international positions of Hungary and 
Romania during the past decade suggests that NATO’s magnetism has indeed exerted a 
great deal of positive influence on the foreign and military directions of both countries, 
but it has failed so far to eliminate the issue of national minorities as the main source of 
mistrust and political tension between them. 
D. ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
The economic cooperation between Romania and Hungary has been positive, 
characterized by a slow but steady increase of the level of trade (see Graph 3) and mutual 
investments. 
Figure 3: Romanian-Hungarian Trade Relations (USD mil)53 
 
The growth of Hungarian-Romanian foreign trade increased significantly after the 
1997 entry of Romania into the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), but 
slowed down slightly thereafter as a result of the market protection measures introduced 
by the Romanian side in June 1999 with respect to imports of Hungarian pork and 
poultry. Hungarian investment in Romania amounted before 2000 to a total of 196 
million USD, a figure that has placed Hungary 10th among countries investing in 
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Romania, the 7th in terms of the total volume of commercial exchange, and the 1st in 
terms of the strongest commercial partner among Romania’s neighbors.54 During the 
same period, the level of Romanian investment in Hungary was only 38 million USD 
strong, mirroring the growing gap between the economic outputs of the two countries. 
The commercial transactions for the first three months of 2001 increased by 148 per cent 
comparing with the same period of the preceding year.55 However, further deterioration 
of the political relations between the two governments in the context of the “Status 
Law”56 and accumulating commercial deficit on the Romanian side, will most probably 
prompt the Romanian government in the coming months to tighten market protection 
measures against Hungarian products. 
E. SUMMARY 
After the fall of communism, newly-found freedoms of speech and expression 
facilitated the emergence of radical nationalism, which had formerly been suppressed by 
authorities for more than four decades. The collapse of communism brought with it 
uncertainty and confusion. In Yugoslavia nationalism became the motivating force for 
unifying the nation. In Romania, motivation emanated from the desire to integrate with 
the Euro-Atlantic institutions, to create a stable and secure environment. The motivation 
centered on gaining entry into organizations that had epitomized everything democratic 
and Western, organizations such as NATO and the EU. This necessitated cooperation not 
only among the numerous ethnic groups within Romania, but with Romania's neighbors. 
This necessitated cooperation in both internal and external arenas. 
It was Romania’s quest for NATO membership that pushed democratic parties to 
introduce the Hungarian minority party into the government in 1996. They proceeded to 
perform an unusual exercise in Romanian political life: negotiations to build a Western 
democracy. Romania was a strong candidate for NATO enlargement in 1997 because of 
                                                 
54 Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.hu 
55 The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro 
56 The law entitles ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and Slovenia to a 
number of benefits (annual three-month work permit in Hungary, medical care and pension benefits, free 
training for Hungarian teachers living in neighboring countries, $80 annual allowance for Hungarian 
families living outside Hungary if they have at least two children who attend a Hungarian-language 
school). Romanian officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the status law, calling it an extraterritorial 
measure that violates the bilateral treaty. For more details on this topic see Eugen Tomiuc, “Hungary: 
Status Law Causing Dispute With Neighbors”, Radio Free Europe: 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/10/04102001123954.asp, October 4, 2001 
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the peaceful and cooperative solution in dealing with the Hungarian minority. The 
benefits of such a solution were acknowledged by the Social Democrat Party, which 
came in power after 2000 elections, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (DAHR) continues to be part of the ruling coalition. The Romanian-Hungarian 
case confirms the idea that the level of international institutions impact depends on the 
congruence with domestic ruling coalitions. 
Romania and Hungary have been working together in their quest for entry into the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO’s programs and structures addressed topics such as 
good relations with neighbors, including no having border disputes. The Romanian 
political institutions were encouraged to fulfill NATO’s clear roadmap of requirements in 
order to make the country part of the international organizations. The most relevant 
aspect is that the Basic Treaty between Romania and Hungary was signed in preparation 
for the Madrid Summit. Both countries came to the meeting with their lessons done. 
Without NATO’s pressure it is hard to believe that the document might had been signed 
after only several months of negotiations and one official high- level meeting (the second 
official high- level meeting happened when the Basic Treaty was signed). The Basic 
Treaty with Hungary has significantly "legitimized" Romania's efforts to establish good 
neighbor relations in the West's view.  Western pressure in relation to NATO enlargement 
played a decisive role in persuading the two sides to resolve their differences over the 
bilateral treaty. NATO members, in particular the United States, made clear to both 
countries that they would not be able to join the Alliance unless they signed the bilateral 
treaty. Only after this was the treaty signed. “The high- level, forceful, frank interference” 
of the West on this issue is pointed out by the declarations of the US ambassadors to 
Hungary and Romania that “both sides are committed because they know that the treaty 
clears an important hurdle to an even more historic goal: integration with the West.”57 
The Hungarian-Romanian treaty illustrates how the incentive of NATO membership 
provided a major impetus to efforts to overcome a long-standing dispute in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Within the NATO framework, bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary 
are evolving from historic reconciliation to genuine partnership. 
                                                 
57 Pal Dunay, “Hungarian-Romanian Relations: a Changed Paradigm?”, Institute for Security Studies, 
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V. RESTRUCTURING THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES 
Romania has undertaken significant steps in reforming its defense institutions and 
aligning its military to NATO compatibility standards in terms of the structure of the 
armed forces, proper equipment, infrastructure and adequate levels of readiness. In the 
words of a former Romanian Minister of Defense, the ultimate objective is to 
…transform the military from a mass army designed for mass 
confrontations to a professional military able to participate efficiently in a 
large range of missions within both the national and multinational 
framework.58 
 
The restructuring process went through three stages during the 1990-2000 
period:59 
· The goal of the first stage (1994-1994) was to first start to change the 
structure, eliminate political control by the communist party, and develop a 
new legislative framework for defense. 
· The second stage was characterized by completion of structural reforms, 
reorganization of the Armed Forces to units similar to those belonging to 
NATO member states, beginning the process of achieving interoperability 
with NATO forces based on the PfP program, and reform of the military 
education system. 
· The third stage was characterized by reorganization of the command and 
staffs in a modular way compatible with NATO structures, development of a 
new personnel strategy, reconsideration of an officer’s professional career, 
and implementation of the interoperability objectives assumed within PfP. 
If the improvement of Romanian-Hungarian relations is largely a matter of 
political willingness, the capacity of Romania to adjust itself to the requirements of the 
Alliance, given the inherited structure of the armed forces, decaying Soviet military 
                                                 
58 Dr. Victor Babiuc, Romanian Minister of National Defense, “Reform of the Romanian Armed 
Forces:Modernization and Interoperability”, in Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration, ed. Kurt W. 
Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999) 
59 Degeratu, Constantin, FARO 2005-2010: The Path Ahead for the Romanian Armed Forces, Military 
Technology, October 1999. Lt. Gen Constantin Degeratu was the Chief of the Joint Defense Staff of the 
Romanian Armed Forces between 1997-2000. 
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technology, and slow pace of military modernization programs concerning personnel 
policy, hardware modernization, and defense industry reform, raises a lot of difficulties. 
Strongly influenced by US defense planning methods and following the 1999 
NATO call for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), Romania initiated an interagency 
process including the MoD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and the 
intelligence service, that resulted in a comprehensive MAP Annual National Plan (ANP) 
covering defense planning as well as other political, economic, national security, and 
legal issues.60 In addition, the Defense Ministry created the NATO Integration Council in 
June 1999, in order to facilitate communication and cooperation between the defense 
ministry and the General Staff in preparing its ANP. However, under conditions of severe 
economic constraints, the situation of the RAF offers signs for further optimism. Hence, 
the Chief of the Joint Staff, Gen. Popescu, estimates that Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) 
cannot achieve military interoperability by NATO standards before 2014-2019, but in 
operational terms it can catch up relatively quickly with the three recent NATO 
members.61 This last objective might be achieved through partnership goals assumed 
under the PfP PARP. The number of interoperability objectives (IO) and partnership 
goals (PG) assumed by Romania within the PfP PARP program has evolved as fo llows: 
PARP I (1994-1997): 20 IO; PARP II (1997-1999): 44 IO; PARP III (1999-): 84 PGs.62 
In order to find the existing similarities between NATO partnership framework 
development and the restructuring process of the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF), this 
chapter tries to analyze in more detail two aspects: defense budgeting and military 
personnel reduction. 
A. DEFENSE BUDGETING 
The analysis of the Romanian defense budget is mainly based on the data 
provided by figures 4 and 5. Romania emerged from the centrally planned economy with 
a big budget for defense in real terms and as a percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). At the beginning of a decade in which most of the European countries and the US 
                                                 
60 For details see the “Romanian membership Action Plan for Integration into NATO”, http://mae.kappa.ro 
61 Mediafax, “Romania este candidatul cel mai important pentru al doilea val al largirii NATO, asa cum a 
fost Polonia in valul anterior, considera seful Statului Major General”, http://www.mediafax.ro:21 June 
2001 
62 For details see “Parteneriatul pentru pace si extinderea NATO”,http://www.mapn.ro/re2000/romana 
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reduced dramatically their defense expenditure, Romania followed the same trend for two 
main reasons: 
· the elimination of threat of a major conflict among countries; 
· in a democratic society other ministers were able to get more money in order 
to provide a better standard of living and assure some votes for the parties 
during the election (industry, health, education). 
Figure 4. Romanian Defense Budget (USD mil)63 
 
The discussions around NATO as a structure of security in Europe and an 
organization with a very good record in building trust among members and encouraging 
democracy influenced the Romanian government to look for a defense budget very 
similar with those of the NATO countries. In terms of percentage of GDP, Romania 
approaches the NATO European average of 2.2 percent. In term of the amount of money 
provided for defense, the NATO enlargement had a very strong influence on the 
evolution of the budget, after 1996. Before the Madrid summit, Romania showed its 
determination for NATO membership by increasing defense expenditures. Until 
September 11, 2001, NATO enlargement was not a welcomed subject and Romania was 
far away from being included on an eventual list. Consequently, the defense budget has 
dropped. 
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With an economy going down for most of the time in the last decade of the 20th 
century, the Romanian government has been unable to provide long-term plans and to 
guarantee resources to build military capabilities. However, with the help of the US 
Romania was able to develop a multi-year planning programming and budgeting system. 
The first multi-year planning effort was conducted in April through October 1999. The 
multi-year plan was used to prepare Romania’s MAP necessary for developing forces and 
capabilities able to operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept. 
Figure 5. Romanian Defense Budget (percent of GDP) 
 
It is hard to predict the evolution of the Romanian defense budget, even though in 
an official declaration the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Geoana has recently 
assured NATO that in case of admission in NATO as a member, Romania will keep a 
defense budget higher than 2.0 percent of GDP.64 Any contraction in the Romanian 
economy will increase the pressure for reducing the overall defense budget. As a result, 
Romania will be hard pressed to sustain projected defense spending, given the pressure to 
restrict public sector expenditures. Any reforms will take place under the assumption that 
public sector spending will remain flat or even shrink in the upcoming years. Therefore, 
over the short and medium term, any cost incurred restructuring the armed forces will 
have to be based primarily on the reallocation of resources and cost offsets. 
                                                 
64 Radio Free Europe, “Romania: Foreign Minister Says Goal Is To Secure NATO Invitation”: 
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B. DOWNSIZING THE MILITARY PERSONNEL 
Romania had a defense establishment of 150,000 in 1999, about 55 percent of the 
1990 total. In 1998 alone, 11,000 officers and NCOs left the forces, of whom 85 percent 
were majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who did not leave happily; 75 percent 
were over 40 years of age. A graph of officers who have been reduced in 1998-2001 
period is presented in figure 6. 
Figure 6. The Number of Officers Leaving the RAF in 1998-200165 
 
Though the RAF already have substantially downsized, more reductions are to 
come. Personnel development policy needs to be based upon merit and competition and 
structured both to correct a reverse officer pyramid and to achieve balance among the 
officer and NCO corps. Service as a NCO also must be made more attractive.  
Romania approved a "National Security Strategy" and a "Military-Defense 
Doctrine" in 1994. Since 1998 these documents have been rewritten, but not yet 
approved. The RAF need an approved national strategy from which to derive defense 
strategy, military doctrine, and strategic directives. Nevertheless, with the assistance of 
the United Kingdom and United States (Kievenaar Study), a "National Defense 
Framework Action Plan" (FAP) for 2000-2005 and a "Long Term Framework" to 2010 
have been established with the objective of joining NATO by 2005 and the EU by 2010. 
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military personnel. According to the army reform, by 2004 the overall defense 
establishment will decline to 140,000 (112,000 military personnel and 28.000 civilians). 
This variant was a political decision taken because of Romania's financial limitations.  
Phase one of the FAP (2000-2003) is to restructure the forces to achieve minimal 
operational capability; that is to provide credible defense and NATO interoperability. 
Phase two (2004-2007) expects to witness equipment modernization and achievement of 
operational capability. Romania's conscript cohort of 135,000 is more than adequate to 
meet its 12-month requirements, which were 67,000 in 1998 and will be reduced to 
25,000 after 2000. 
The officer corps pyramid is malformed and needs to be streamlined. Hence, 
before 2003 the current 30,000-strong Romanian officer corps must be halved. For 
example, its 2,300 colonels must be reduced to 630; the 5,618 lieutenant colonels to 
1,800; the 7,800 majors to 2,200; and the 9,908 captains to 4,050. At the same time 
lieutenants should be increased from 3,051 to 3,750, and second lieutenants from 2,218 to 
2,400. Also generals will increase from the current 101 to 120. Restructuring this 
unbalanced officer corps will be a difficult and painful process. 
For the next few years, Romanian Human Resources Management Policy is to 
increase the number of NCOs in order to achieve a 3 to 1 ratio between NCOs and 
officers. The training of NCOs will continue to be a top priority. In order to build a 
professional NCO corps, focus has been placed on their training and the involvement of 
personnel trained in collaboration with the US Marine Corps. The American training 
pattern, in accordance with the NATO standards and training methods, has been 
generalized in all the NCO military training institutions. Up to 2002, during the 2nd MAP 
Cycle, almost 2,800 NCOs have been trained in different Romanian training facilities 
using NATO standards and methods. A new concept will be developed for the use of 
NCOs within the military establishment as platoon leaders as well as in administrative 
and staff positions. Junior officers will also receive training in the effective employment 
of the NCOs. 
All discharged military personnel have been recipients of the Romanian re-
conversion process and many have received employment counseling, training and 
                                                 
65 Human Resources Management Directorate: http://www.mapn.ro/engleza/index.htm 
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assistance in finding new jobs. NATO analysts were concerned about the impact such a 
big number of soldiers being released will have on the labor market and Romanian 
society. Consequently, a re-conversion program was developed by Romania in 
cooperation with NATO specialized structures and it is sponsored by the World Bank. 
The re-education and resettlement programs for redundant military personnel have had 
the following results as of September 1, 2002:  
· 1,687 personnel had received employment counseling;  
· 850 personnel had applied for training courses to convert to a civilian career 
and should commence training shortly;  
· 172 personnel were receiving training;  
· 146 personnel had found employment; 
· 143 personnel had received advice on starting new businesses; and 
· 64 personnel had been helped in successfully starting new business ventures.66 
The armed forces restructuring process will continue till the meeting of the 
objectives included into the “Force Project 2005”, which consists of 70,000 soldiers and 
15,000 civilians.67  
It is hard to find a specific NATO requirement about the size of military 
personnel, but the initial discussions with Romanian representatives in NATO roundtable 
suggested that the number were to big. A very important document is Kievenaar Study 
which was agreed by NATO organisms and became a standard in Romania-NATO 
negotiations. The guidance in documents like this has been taken into account in 
Romanian defense planning decisions. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
To answer questions concerning NATO influence on the Romanian national 
security policy in the Post Cold War Era, this thesis examined Romania’s arguments for 
joining the Alliance, the building blocks and mechanisms by which NATO extended its 
institutional and normative influence, and how these contributed to reducing chances for 
military conflict and political tension in the region and to reform of the Romanian Armed 
Forces. 
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact dissolution in 1991, there was a need to 
establish a new security architecture in and for Europe and reconsider the existing 
military institutions because the West sought to promote security and stability in Europe 
and to expand the democratic system and values. NATO, by surviving these exciting 
times, turned out to be the security and defense framework for Europe. NATO had to 
change and adapt its internal civil and military structures, and reshape its posture of 
forces and echelons for combat and peace support operations. The Alliance also redefined 
its attitude towards other states, accepted three new members, and is looking for a “big 
bang” enlargement solution during the Prague summit. 
Facing new political and economic instabilities and security risks, Romania, like 
other Central and Eastern European countries, started to seek guarantees and insurance 
for its security. These guarantees can be received only in an alliance with a system of 
collective defense that has proved its validity. This alliance proved to be NATO. 
Romania experienced a violent revolutionary change as part of the democratic 
changes that took place in Europe. The victory of the 1989 Revolution opened the path to 
democratic reforms. The new internal political environment changed by putting into place 
political pluralism and the market economy. 
The post-communist evolution of the country went through different dynamics, 
but the foreign policy was and still is focused on the same strategic objective: NATO 
integration. For achieving this important objective, Romania started the process of 
implementing NATO’s requirements. Through an evolutionary process, both NATO and 
Romania have adapted their institutions, structures and norms for a better cooperation 
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and full interoperability. In view of the future NATO membership a great number of 
changes have been made in numerous fields, from external relations to legislation and 
serious downsizing of the armed forces. 
The relations between Romania and Hungary, which have been plagued by a 
painful legacy of distrust and acrimony, have developed, influenced by the NATO 
mechanisms, into a strategic partnership. 
All the activities that have been taken in the area of budgeting and downsizing the 
military personnel were consistent with the Romanian interest in becoming a NATO 
member (1996-1997). When the discussions about NATO enlargement included Romania 
as a possible candidate, the efforts were intensified to increase the speed of reform, while 
the processes were slowed when NATO membership was not on the horizon (1998-
2000). 
NATO’s magnetism has exerted a great deal of positive influence on institutions 
and decision-making processes on defense related aspects. 
In the twelve years of democratization Romania managed to put behind for good 
the legacy of the communist past, to establish working institutions, and to reintegrate into 
the community of free and democratic nations. It made its civilizational choice to belong 
to the world of stability and prosperity. Romania was realistic and consistent, within the 
framework of PfP, in its efforts to establish peace, security, confidence, and cooperation 
in the area. 
Even though the trend looks like Romania following most of the NATO 
recommendations, there is an evident increase of speed and willingness in the decision 
process for reform associated with the NATO enlargement. All the domestic factors pay 
more attention to NATO’s requirements when Romania has some chance to gain 
membership. 
Romania’s integration into NATO could be an asset for European stability and 
security, since the democratic security is a long-term investment for the stability of 
continent and beyond. 
The building up of a secure and stable Europe can be achieved only with the 
involvement of all states that belong to this area of culture and civilization. Romania is 
part of this process and can further contribute to its success.  
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The new security risks need a common approach and a united endeavor of the 
states that have the necessary capabilities and political will to approach them. Romania 
cannot afford to waste another decade without a Western anchor, as Europe will not be 
“whole and free” without the integration of Romania within the Euro-Atlantic 
community. Romania has the capability and the availability to promote the NATO 
interests and values in the adjacent areas.  
Romania’s integration into NATO will create an opportunity to better promote 
effective patterns of cooperation, with neighboring countries, as a credible model for the 
all countries in transition from South-East-Europe.  
Taking into account its regional importance, due to the geographic location, 
territory, size of population, political and military potential, Romania will enhance –at a 
political and military level – the Alliance’s capability to prevent and to manage crisis in 
the region.  
The South-Eastern Europe is passing through a difficult process from the security 
perspective. Acute social inequalities and imbalances, less than adequate overall 
democratic developments, ethnic and religious conflicts, illegal traffic with arms, people 
and narcotics, unresolved historical bilateral or multilateral tensions, and environmental 
pollution are only some of the major problems with which this area is confronted at the 
beginning of the 21st century. The fall of the Iron Curtain revealed all these aspects in a 
freer world, but the solutions have seemed harder to find and implement. In this respect, 
Romania has the chance to be a catalyst for bilateral relations of the countries from the 
region, facilitating, at the same time, the identification of lasting solutions for the tensions 
that may occur. The regional policy promoted by Romania can further facilitate the 
establishment of a framework for reconciliation and cooperation compatible with the 
European spirit.  
Also, besides all the mechanisms describe in the analysis, through which NATO 
put the pressure on internal institutions, there are other aspects that can contribute to the 
process of developing a modern Romanian National Security. One of them is the direct 
contact of Romanian political and military actors with other countries and systems. How 
much influence can people trained abroad bring to the Romanian security system? This is 
a question for further research.  
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In recent debates about NATO enlargement, subjects like corruption, 
privatization, and the use of former Securitate members in intelligence agencies and the 
possibility that they might come in contact with NATO classified documents have been 
discussed. How much can NATO expand its influence in areas that are not obviously 
connected with NATO prime objectives? 
And finally, NATO has tremendously increased its partnership with Russia and 
there is likelihood that seven new members will be accepted increasing the number of 
NATO countries to 26. What kind of organization will NATO become and what new 
mechanisms will be developed to keep the newly admitted states on the right track? 
Keeping NATO's incentives "alive" and keeping Romania engaged in NATO’s 
programs and structures has had a serious impact in promoting reforms and democratic 
changes. By wrapping NATO's umbrella around any country willing to join the Alliance 
it can encourages it to pursue reform. 
NATO is not a static organization and the process of becoming compatible is a 
dynamic and complex one. To make it successful it needs a strong and long-term 
commitment from the political forces, and the people involved in dealing with every day 
requirements and standards should have good international skills. 
All NATO’s documents and programs provide a framework for discussions and 
they are very broad. The people who worked to make them possible do the difference in 
the way the standards are implemented. No matter where they are, in Bucharest, Brussels, 
or any Euro-Atlantic capital they need to be professional, competent, and tolerant, 
because finally they make the most important difference between the paper and real life 
issues. NATO's chief strength is not in its military forces but in the unified spirit of a free 
Euro-Atlantic people. 
NATO has been - and still is - a catalyst for peace, stability, freedom and 
prosperity. Romania can consider itself lucky for being part of NATO’s attention. The 
early PfP objectives and later MAP challenges have put pressure on the whole spectrum 
of Romanian society, from ordinary citizens to political leaders. The bar for NATO 
membership has been permanently raised. Closer scrutiny is placed on applicants, 
detailed evaluation, and tighter controls are employed to be sure that the states are 
following the Alliance’s recommendations. However, there is an important flow of aid, 
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assistance, and guidance, much of it from the US. Without such control and help, 
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